Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, America.gov, as part of its feature “The Evolving Work of Democracy,” is asking academics and journalists from the United States and elsewhere to comment on the challenges to democracy that still lay ahead for countries of the former Eastern Bloc. What follows are their responses – and yours are welcomed as well.

What is the greatest challenge facing democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

When I was approached by the editor of “Tracking Democracy in Eastern Europe” with the proposition of writing for this blog series, I welcomed the opportunity to address a policy-oriented audience. In doing so now, I bring to the table ethnographic insight and anthropological commitment to a nuanced and culturally sensitive critical reflection, which ultimately impels me to inquire into the very question which was directed my way: “What is the biggest challenge facing democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina?” In the brief commentary that follows, I’d like to consider how framing democracy in terms of a universal human need for freedom may in fact serve to occlude our understanding of contemporary Bosnian politics and of what is at stake for Bosnian citizens today.

During the sixteen months I spent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, witnessing and researching transformations of local politics in this country, I did not meet a single person who highlighted the somewhat abstract “human need for freedom” as the main priority in her life or as a cause worthy of struggle. Instead, I met many people who spoke about the lack of, to use a somewhat old-fashioned word, “system” that to them described a set of functional, capable institutions, which could guarantee a minimum of security and a “normal life” for them and their families. While it may be tempting to reduce these desires to remnants of “the long dead” Yugoslav socialism and even posit them as reactionary, such calls for strengthening of governmental institutions remind one of the theories of social contract which are so central to the liberal tradition out of which modern notions of democracy spring. And given the profound sense of insecurity Bosnians and Herzegovinians feel due to the latest round of the post-war political crisis, such desires ought to make sense even to the most casual, external observer.

The point I am trying to drive home in this short response is that we must pay attention to local understandings of democracy, and place desires that surround them into their proper historical, political and social context. To the majority of ex-Yugoslavs, the fall of the Berlin wall announced not the triumph of freedom, but of new, radical forms of violence, displacement and oppression. The post-war period in Bosnia gave rise to a new sense of precariousness and social injustice, which affects how democracy is viewed and talked about. And ethnic tensions, which were seen as the cause of the war, were in fact normalized in the post-war period of “democratic transition” through Dayton-created institutions that to this day organize the country according to nationalist ideological principles. Citizens of Bosnia must articulate themselves politically as first and foremost members of their national groups that are now located in specific territories and presumably have homogenous interests. The limitations of the Dayton framework can be recognized in a peculiar paradox: a Serb living in the Muslim-Croat Federation cannot be the president of the country; neither can a Croat or a Muslim from Republika Srpska. Today, Bosnians live through the contradictions of this “undemocratic democracy” created in the war’s aftermath. Therefore, in order to seriously pose a question that provoked this response, perhaps it would be best to start tuning into the local narratives and struggles that attempt to define more desirable forms of politics in terms that do not confirm the assumptions outsiders often hold about a place as singular and complex as post-war Bosnia or about democracy at large. Only then will efforts to define and make possible a more just and democratic society bear fruit.

Larisa Kurtović is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley. She recently completed 16 months in Bosnia-Herzegovina conducting research.

For more on Larisa Kurtović’s observations from her 2006 and 2007 research trips to Bosnia-Herzegovina, see: “Think” Future: Constructing Hope and Anti-Nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina (PDF, 127KB).

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, America.gov, as part of its feature “The Evolving Work of Democracy,” is asking academics and journalists from the United States and elsewhere to comment on the challenges to democracy that still lay ahead for countries of the former Eastern Bloc. What follows are their responses – and yours are welcome as well.

Slovenia, then a constituent republic of Yugoslavia, had its first post-World War II multiparty election in the spring of 1990. The election was democratic and there were no credible charges of vote fraud. A broad coalition of democratic parties won the election and formed a government that completed a peaceful transition to a parliamentary democracy with a constitution and legal system in place by June 25, 1991. On that date the new country declared its independence from Yugoslavia and defended its decision in a brief, armed conflict with the Yugoslav military. In subsequent years, Slovenia won international recognition of its status and membership in the United Nations, in the European Union, and in NATO.

Equally important, the democratic institutions adopted in 1990 and 1991 have remained intact. There have been regular, constitutionallly mandated quadrennial elections, every fifth year elections for president (with a two-term limit), and local elections every fourth year — all of them accepted as democratic in nature and unchallenged in terms of honesty. This experience of the past two decades does not indicate any realistic threat to this pattern.

Concern can be noted primarily in the fundamental cleavage in Slovene society. This is due for the most part to the legacy of the profound civil war that shook Slovenia during World War II (1941–1945), when it was under foreign occupation. In those years a powerful resistance movement arose, the Communist-dominated Partisans, part of a pan-Yugoslav force led by Josip Broz Tito. In Slovenia, the Partisans pursued a campaign directed primarily against domestic elements opposed to the imposition of a postwar Communist government. This opposition, coalesced primarily as the Home Guards, was strongly anti-Communist. It also felt compelled to make arrangements with the occupying forces, something that was exploited by the Partisans.

The complete Partisan victory in 1945 led both to the imposition of an undemocratic regime that remained in power until 1990, and to extensive massacres of those Home Guard elements unable to escape the country. This crime was officially concealed until the 1990s and the defeated elements were portrayed as “traitors” until then, a view propaged by official media and the educational system throughout the period. It is this legacy with which Slovene society still deals and the feelings on the respective sides are still very deep. Also affecting the situation is the fact that the transition to democracy left the heirs of the previous regime in control of the bulk of the levers of economic and media power.

What is most important overall, however, is the fact that Slovenia made a successful transition to a multiparty democratic society and that this fundamental achievement has put down roots that are strong enough to withstand any foreseeable challenges.

Rudolph M. Susel taught Eastern European history at Arizona State University and has edited several books and newspapers having to do with Slovene issues.

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, America.gov, as part of its feature “The Evolving Work of Democracy,” is asking academics and journalists from the United States and elsewhere to comment on the challenges to democracy that still lay ahead for countries of the former Eastern Bloc. What follows are their responses – and yours are welcome as well.

What is the greatest challenge facing democracy in Germany?

Twenty years after the unexpected and certainly not sought for by the majority in the East or the West unification or, as some prefer to say, the reunification of Germany, the chief problem facing the country is posed by the political name of the country itself: the Bundesrepublik. In what sense is it a “Bund” and how does it bind its members? And perhaps more important, in what sense is it a “republic”?

The constitution of the old Bundesrepublik of West Germany was sometimes referred to as the “oktroyierte Verfassung” imposed on a defeated totalitarian aggressor. But it became, over time, a positive cultural trait that fostered what Jürgen Habermas popularized as “constitutional patriotism.” The crucial moment in this development of Western democracy was the coming together of the activism of the student-led New Left with the changes in the Social Democratic Party that, after having given up its Marxist orthodoxy at Bad Godesberg in 1959, recognized the need, as new Chancellor Willy Brandt put it succinctly, “to dare to accept more democracy” in all aspects of life (mehr Demokratie wagen). The maintenance of the republic, its rule of law, and respect for human rights would be maintained even during the dark days of the Notstandsgesetzen, the laws of exception against the threat of a misguided left-wing terrorism.

Meanwhile, in the East, a “democratic republic” gradually asserted its power after the repression of a genuine working class rebellion in 1953. The legitimacy of this regime was based on its title: The “German Democratic Republic” claimed to stand for true democracy against the representative republic in the West. Its claim was that it spoke for the people whereas the Westerners were simply the voice of capital. It in fact created a kind of kleinbürgerliche society of mediocrity that seemed to guarantee its political power. This seemed to justify the claim of the GDR that its republic was the true one, since it assured not only equality before the law but real social equality.

When the Wall fell, the new Bundesrepublik was supposed to unite a western republican democracy that accepted liberal inequality as long as it was procedurally legitimate with an eastern democratic republic which sought to eliminate inequality by means of state intervention.

Although the party landscape has come to resemble the one that existed in the old West Germany, the content of political debate is no longer the same. The West — be it the Social Democrats (SPD) or the proponents of a “social market economy” (CDU, CSU)¬ — never understood why its Eastern compatriots rejected their democratic socialism. As a result, the “two Germanys” remain apart despite their unification. And this, it seems to me, is one of the reasons that the formerly stable three-party West German party system (CDU-SPD-FDP) has now devolved into a five-party carousel whose ability to form coalitions is increasingly threatened.

To summarize in a word: the West never understood the East, either for what it (misguidedly) pretended to be, and therefore it was unable to integrate its new citizens, or to understand its new status. That is why I prefer to talk about a unification of Germany rather than a reunification.

Learn more about Professor Dick Howard

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, America.gov, as part of its feature “The Evolving Work of Democracy,” is asking academics and journalists from the United States and elsewhere to comment on the challenges to democracy that still lay ahead for countries of the former Eastern Bloc. What follows are their responses – and yours are welcome as well.

What is the greatest challenge facing democracy in Poland?

The state of democracy in Poland is good, at least compared to some other countries of Central Europe where xenophobic and anti-Semitic parties are quite strong. In Poland they do not count. The greatest challenge, in my opinion, is the political apathy of Polish voters which leads to a very low turnout in the elections, usually one of the lowest in Europe. As a result, some rather mediocre characters get sometimes elected to the parliament.

The root cause of this apathy is a general distrust of politicians and politics in Poland. There are historical explanations for this phenomenon — the history of partition and foreign occupations of our country — as well as more recent developments, like the pain of market transformations in the last 20 years and disappointment with many prominent political figures, including the ones who get due credit for their past achievements in the fight against communism when they had shown enormous courage. Unfortunately, nobody is perfect, and qualities useful in an era of confrontation with a totalitarian regime do not always serve well in a normal democratic country where politics is a game of compromises, making deals, etc.

I could also draw attention to other weaknesses, like a too-small intellectual base for politics in a form of think tanks — there are still not enough of them and politicians do not use existing ones to a sufficient extent. Besides, media do not play their role as one of the pillars of democracy in a satisfactory way. They are so commercialized that they approach political issues too often in a sensationalized way which undermines their credibility.

That said, I would not assess the situation of Polish democracy as bad. In the U.S. you also have serious problems with the democratic process, as the debate about the health care reform shows.

Tomasz Zalewski is a journalist writing from Washington for the Polish Press Agency (PAP) and the weekly Polityka news magazine.

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, America.gov, as part of its feature “The Evolving Work of Democracy,” is asking academics and journalists from the United States and elsewhere to comment on the challenges to democracy that still lay ahead for countries of the former Eastern Bloc. What follows are their responses – and yours are welcome as well.

The challenges that Serbia faces today I don’t see as particularly different from those experienced by other post-socialist countries, or for that matter many other societies around the world. The global nature of the economic and financial crisis has only revealed correlation between Serbia’s internal democratization processes and the ones outside of its borders. (Fewer foreign investments have slowed down privatization of the manufacturing and other industries, for example.) So one set of challenges is simply tied to the current global situation, and the other set of challenges is more of an interior nature and tied to the stage in democratization processes taking place since 2000, the year that ended Milosevic’s rule. Despite various criticisms, launched at different times by different political factors, NGOs or citizens of Serbia themselves, there is no question that in the past nine years Serbia has advanced in its democratization despite many challenges of moral, political and economic nature that tend to shake up the country, whose democratic institutions are not yet stable. The moral challenges pertain to rebuilding the system of values that was shattered in the wars of Yugoslav disintegration, in which process it is crucial that various religious communities (especially the Serbian Orthodox Church as the most influential) and the civil sector find common agendas and work at the grass root level to reinforce the culture of civility, human dignity and tolerance. The political challenges are many, most notable being the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence and the awkwardness it created, amplified by the division of the international community itself, in which the status of Serbia’s southern border remains ambiguous. This problem can ultimately be resolved (for I don’t believe it could ever be “solved,” given the radically different views of it) only with full membership in the EU, which would then help redefine the meaning of the borders for both parties. Further strengthening of the independent judicial system, and better implementation of the anti-corruption laws will bring Serbia greater stability, as will its continued participation in the Partnership for Peace (but not NATO), and integration in the EU. The economic challenges are tied to Serbia’s realistic approach to its resources, natural and human, and careful evaluation of the effects of foreign investments and privatization on its citizens, so that worsening of the economic situation does not threaten political stability in this vulnerable period of transition.

Learn more about Milica Bakic-Hayden, Ph.D.

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, America.gov, as part of its feature “The Evolving Work of Democracy,” is asking academics and journalists from the United States and elsewhere to comment on the challenges to democracy that still lay ahead for countries of the former Eastern Bloc. What follows are their responses – and yours are welcome as well.

What is the greatest challenge facing democracy in Romania?

In December 1989 Romanians revolted against Nicolae Ceausescu’s decrepit Stalinist dictatorship. Many thought that the upheaval and the bloodshed that cost around 1,400 lives would result in a complete divorce with the past. Instead, the new regime, headed by former propaganda apparatchik Ion Iliescu, tried to maintain authoritarianism under the facade of democratic rhetoric. In 1996, a new president, Emil Constantinescu, was elected as candidate of the umbrella coalition called the Democratic Convention. Reforms were initiated, Romania pursued a decisively pro-Western foreign policy, and many hoped that those changes would result in an unequivocal democratic breakthrough.

In 2000, Iliescu made a political comeback, and the country was governed by his party, the Social Democrats, in fact a corporation with mafia-like business tentacles.

Traian Basescu won the 2004 election with a platform that promised eradication of corruption, modernization of political institutions, economic growth, and strengthening of the rule of law. A former sea captain (during the Ceausescu era), Basescu had served as minister of transportation and mayor of Bucharest. Responding to demands from civil society, he adopted de-communization as a major political goal. In April 2006 he formed a presidential commission to examine the four decades of communist rule, and in December 2006, in spite of rabid opposition from communist nostalgists and extreme nationalists, he delivered an historical speech condemning the communist regime as illegitimate and criminal.

Political factionalism and resistance from oligarchic groups, irritated by Basescu’s innovative initiatives, created a continuous state of tension between the president and his vociferous critics. Presidential elections will take place in November 2009. Belonging to EU and NATO has helped Romania economically, politically, and in terms of security. The main challenges for the future are linked to judiciary reforms, the need to rejuvenate the political elite, to overcome a widespread climate of cynicism, to fight corruption, and to continue the confrontation with the totalitarian traumatic past. The most important challenges deal with the perpetuation of corruption, endless bickering within political parties, and the refusal to allow for a general restructuring of the political system. One of Traian Basescu’s main goals for a second mandate is to organize a national debate to result in the adoption of a new constitution. This challenge is directly linked to the need to ensure thorough judicial reforms that would guarantee the independence of judges from political pressures. Traian Basescu strove to pursue this agenda, but he encountered adamant opposition from political personalities and economic magnates who resented the president’s anti-corruption drive. The courageous Minister of Justice Monica Macovei was forced to resign in 2007. Last but not least, restoring trust in political institutions remains an urgent challenge.

Learn more about Professor Vladimir Tismaneanu